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RELIGIOUS
DISCRIMINATION IN
INSTITUTIONS AND
SERVICES
J.P. DARROUZET*
What this is all about is very simple. When the young lady comes to
your hospital (that has been funded by Hill-Burton) and says: I want a
tubal ligation, or I want a abortion; or a young man comes in and says: I
want a vasectomy; you are going to tell her or him, NO.
And a suit is going to be filed; and at that particular stage, what I
would like to encourage you to do is give some serious thought to the idea
of going into Court and saying: Listen, Judge, hang on a minute will you,
my hospital has a right to discriminate; a constitutional right to discrimi-
nate on the basis of religion.
That probably sounds a bit rough to start with, but hang on a minute
and we will see.
First of all, I want to tell you briefly how the problem came about. Just
after the Roe' and Doe2 cases appeared on the scene, our Bishop in Austin
called a meeting of all the local hospitals in the area and some other people
showed up, including some Houston lawyers who represent some hospitals
down there. And during the course of the meeting, one lawyer made a
statement. Now I don't know if you act the way I do or not, but once in
awhile I hear a statement and the hairs go up on the back of my neck, and
I say: Something is wrong with that. But I don't know what it is. So I
immediately go back to my three book federal library and begin looking.
What the lawyer had said was: Catholic hospitals cannot discriminate
on the basis of creed, and that is the law.
This is what bugged me, because I couldn't figure out where he got it
from. So I checked, and this is what I found out:
The Hill-Burton Act doesn't say a word about non-discrimination on
the basis of creed. 3 The only thing it does say that even closely resembles
this, is what Vince told you, namely: that you have to serve everyone in
* Diocesan Attorney, Austin Texas.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
42 U.S.C. § 291 et seq. (1970).
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the area. Of course, if you have funds which have been given for a specific
out-patient facility (like we were dealing with, a cancer clinic), you don't
have to serve everybody, just those who have the illness which the out-
patient facility is directed to (i.e., it has got to serve everybody, but it
doesn't say anything about serving others than those it was designed for).
Now if you have been involved in Hill-Burton (and incidentally, I
hadn't been when the application was made), you are aware of the fact that
you have to fill out an application form where you give a number of "assur-
ances". You send in the application form and soon you get back from the
State Health Department a letter saying, okay, you have been cleared for
Hill-Burton funds; and they attach a copy of your application.
I had the letter and attached copy of the application, and neither the
letter nor the attached copy of the application had anything about creed,
or discrimination on the basis of creed. There was, in the application
(assurances), however, a reference to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and it says
there that in a federally funded project nobody shall discriminate against
anyone seeking aid thereunder, on the basis of race, color or place of origin.
Nothing about creed, only race, color or place of origin.4 The copy of the
application also referred to regulations at 45 C.F.R. Part 80, 5 so I looked
there and all it referred to was race, color and place of origin.
I was at a loss, so I wrote to the lawyer in Houston to ask for the basis
of his remark. He sent me in return, a copy of another set of regulations,
42 C.F.R. Part 53, and finally, there, it said, you shall not discriminate as
to anyone seeking aid, on the basis of creed.' This reference to "creed" was
in a separate paragraph and "race, color or place of origin" was referred
to in another paragraph. How did this phrasing get there? Why didn't our
application have anything in it with reference to "CREED"?
After getting my spies to work, I managed to solve the problem:
It appeared that when they sent back the copy of the application with
the letter of approval, they sent back a Xerox copy of the application; and
in Xeroxing same, they had Xeroxed out paragraph Q, which assures the
United States that the applicant won't discriminate on the basis of
"creed". I further found out what had happened was, that before the 1964
Amendment to the Hill-Burton Act, there was a provision in the Act which
said that you couldn't discriminate on the basis of creed. But when they
amended the Act in 1964, this provision was taken out.
That, of course, raises an interesting question; and I am not sure that
I can give you the answer.
But, however, I can give you a place you can get started with the
research on it; and that is in the area which deals with the question of what
is the effect on the law of an amendment removing a requirement or stan-
42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970).
See 45 C.F.R. § 80.1 et seq. (1972).
See 45 C.F.R. § 53.1 et seq. (1972).
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dard set by the prior law.'
In short, what happens to a regulation enacted in accordance with a
prior existing law, when the law is amended to eliminate the requirement
that the regulation goes to?
I don't really know the answer, but I am inclined to think that the
regulation is no longer any good.
Why? In the Administrative Law Act, you find that the department
head has the right to make regulations to implement the applicable act.
If you look at the Hill-Burton Act, you find that the Secretary of HEW and
the Surgeon General (no longer extant) have the right to make regulations
to implement the Hill-Burton ActY Now if the Act to be implemented gives
standards, then the Department head charged with regulation-making
can't go beyond the standards set by the Act. There are some Supreme
Court cases dealing with the subject of the extent of the regulations as
related to the Act from which they stem. One such case is United States
v. George,"' which goes all the way back to a 1913 case, where, among other
things, the Court said that if the Secretary (Department head) may add,
by regulation, one condition, may he not then add another? Implicitly the
Court was saying if it were permissible for the Department head to add one
thing which wasn't in the Act, then he could keep on adding and adding
and adding and adding. This, the Court said, the Department head could
not do. A more recent case on the subject is United States v. Southwest
Cable Company."
Anyway, this is what brought the problem up. In other words, can an
institution, like a hospital, that is funded by Hill-Burton, act to discrimi-
nate? Okay, first of all, I would like to say this, the government, the United
States Government and the state governments, clearly discriminate, both
from the ridiculous, I suppose you might say, to the real serious. Let me
give you an example. I hold a title in the United States as Grand Mullet
of the hand-ball players; which means that in more sanctioned tourna-
ments I have been beaten quicker than anybody else in the United States.
Can you imagine what would happen to me if I went over, just out of the
clear blue, and said I want to play in the handball courts of the Pentagon?
They do have government handball courts over there. They would proba-
bly throw me out. This is an act of discrimination, because discrimination
has been defined legally as treating somebody differently than somebody
else.
Sex discrimination in the ridiculous: Can you imagine what would
happen if I went into the ladies toilet in the Capital? You laugh at that? I
7 2 AM. JuR. 2D ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 300 et seq. (1962).
5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 291(c) (1970).
228 U.S. 14 (1913).
392 U.S. 157 (1968). Another, and even later case, is Mourning v. Family Pub. Serv., 411
U.S. 356 (1973).
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know incidences where women have, you know, protested on the business
of separate toilets. That is a form of discrimination. Moving on, suppose
you had a fellow with a physical problem that needed physical therapy, a
poor fellow, and he went over to the gym in the Sam Rayburn Building.
Do you imagine they would let him in? Of course the answer is no. One of
the forms of government discrimination that I consider very serious, and I
am sure there have been things written on it, although I don't know them
offhand, is the idea of competitive contracts. I think that is discrimination.
But perhaps the worst discrimination in government, that I know of (at
least I think of it this way, because perhaps, I have had clients who have
been involved with it), is the discrimination that the government levels
against ex-convicts. This is really so, and all of you know it. How many
states today in the Union keep ex-convicts (even ones that have been ex-
convicts for 10, 15, or 20 years) off juries. They all do. If any of you know
a case which says that a man cannot fire an ex-convict just because he is
an ex-convict, in other words, cannot fire him on that basis alone, let me
know, I would love to know the case, I really would. A couple other instan-
ces of government discrimination which have occurred; one in Florida, one
in Oklahoma, are where you have the situation of the recognition of groups
in state colleges or universities. In Florida there was a case where the young
socialists sought recognition in a government college and they were turned
down.12 The Court said they didn't have to recognize them. In Oklahoma
the same thing happened with the gays, and the Court said you did have
to recognize them. I don't know if there is a significance there or not.
What I am going to do now is discuss a few cases that deal with
discrimination in the form of government discriminating, private institu-
tions discriminating on other bases; and private institutions discriminat-
ing on the basis of religion. And when I do, I would like you to keep two or
three things in mind. First of all, the idea of two balls hitting against each
other. The second idea is that in all these cases somebody acts. There is
an actor and an actee, and the religious motive is in one of those two, so
bear that in mind. And the third thing is the intensity. The intensity of
the action. By intensity I mean, how do you personally react to this as
being an awful thing (really serious), or not so awful thing (ridiculous).
Let's start out and I'll give you an example of what I am talking about
in the field of government in religion. First case I would like to call your
attention to is again one that is kind of funny, I think. This happened
somewhere in the Seventh Circuit where, at the district court level, the
bailiff came in and said, everyone stand up, and Mr. Chase sat down; he
didn't stand up, and the court came in and saw the fellow sitting there,
and among other things, he said to him, why don't you stand up, and he
said, it's a matter of religion with me; very seriously, he says, it's a matter
2 Merkey v. Board of Regents of Fla., 344 F. Supp. 1296 (N.D. Fla. 1972).
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of religion with me. '3 He says, I just believe in my soul that we are created
equal and that you are no better than I am and I don't have to stand up,
and the judge said, you are in contempt of court and the Seventh Circuit
says he sure was. This was kind of facetious, but it is still the government
discriminating in the field of religion.
Take religion in prison cases. Now those are cases where the govern-
ment interferes with religion in prison. They are cases where the govern-
ment discriminates on the basis of religion. There is the Moslem religion;
the Jewish religion in the case of food; there is even a case of a religion
which was made up in prison and the court said that the prisoners had to
be given the right to practice their own religion, even if it was made up,
and even if the court thought it was funny (and the court did think it was
funny). Finally, you have the case which went to the Supreme Court,
which was Cruz v. Beto4 where the Buddhists in the Texas prisions had
to be let practice their religion in prison, even though it posed a real
problem. " (And even though, as one of the judges noted, if everybody in
prision had to be let practice their religion, you would really disrupt the
prison system.)
Those are cases of government discriminating in religion. There was
another one of importance to note, which was the case of Anderson v.
Laird." I am sure most of you are familiar with that case, which is where
Anderson sued Laird (who was the Secretary of Defense at the time);
because they were requiring the students at West Point and Annapolis to
go to chapel on Sunday. The Court said the students didn't have to do this.
That was discrimination and a violation of the students' first amendment
rights. Again government in religion.
Moving over into the area of private institutions discriminating in
matters other than religion; I would like to call your attention to the
following cases; and some of them are very interesting. Of course, probably
the foremost one is the case of Moose Lodge 7 which came out in 1972 in
the Supreme Court. Where a man, Irvis was his name, was a black man
and some fellow who was in the Moose Lodge took him in as a guest and
the Lodge refused to serve him. Irvis sued saying that they violated his
constitutional rights as a guest, on racial grounds. (This is discrimination
on bases other than religion, that we are now dealing with, i.e., discrimina-
tion in private institutions not on the basis of religion). The Supreme Court
13 In re Chase, 468 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1972).
405 U.S. 319 (1972).
See Hoggro v. Pontesso, 456 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1972); Rowland v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005
(8th Cir. 1971); Bethea v. Daggatt, 329 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Ga. 1970). See also Tinker v. Des
Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422 (10th
Cir. 1971); Williams v. Eaton, 310 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Wyo. 1970), on remand, 333 F. Supp.
107 (D. Wyo. 1971).
466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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said you can do this. This was a private act of discrimination.
Now when you start dealing in this area, you get into the area of the
so-called state action, and that is a bugaboo. I am telling you if you read
the cases on state action in the field of discrimination; as to what consti-
tutes state action (both when you do act, and when you don't act), you are
really in a pickle. The concept of "state action" has been severely criti-
cized.
In this area, Vince mentioned a particular case where they, I believe,
had a private club which was denied tax exemption because it discrimi-
nated on the basis of race; but the court did that solely by a statutory
interpretation. In McGlothen v. Connelly,"x the Court did the same thing
on a constitutional basis; and in Pitts v. Wisconsin,'" the Court did it to a
state law which gave a tax exemption; they threw the private club out of
the tax exemption, because it discriminated on race. But in a very recent
case, McClory v. Shultz,2' the Court refused to deny the private club its
tax exemption on the basis of sexual discrimination (because they wouldn't
let women go into the private club). (Again bear in mind what I was
mentioning above, the intensity of the act of discrimination).
In this regard, I would like to call your attention to a case which I think
comes pretty far in being the height of a court not finding state action. And
it is Braden v. University of Pittsburgh.2 This was a 1972 case. The Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh was established by a state statute which declared it to
be a "stated-related" school. The State of Pennsylvania appointed 1/3 of
the board of directors, and gave 1/3 of the budget to the University. There
were a bunch of feminine activists in the University; and they were fired.
They sued to get back in, alleging both political discrimination as well as
feminine discrimination, and the Court said that there was no state action.
Now I don't know if that was a finding of law, no state action; or whether
they had a bunch of misogynists sitting on the court of appeals. Suffice it
to say that they did not find state action in that case.
Of course there are many cases similar to that in firing of teachers,
for example, the Columbia case;22 Brownley v. Gettysburgh College;23 and
a very recent case called Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School.21
Moving on to this next area, I want to call your attention to where a
private religious institution is doing some action on (or to) its own mem-
bers, and then the state comes in. Now this is based on religion. Religious
' 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
73-1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 12,906.
21 343 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. Pa. 1972) vacated, 477 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973).
22 Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
21 338 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
11 Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 41 U.S.L.W. 2314 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1972). Cf. Bright v.
Isenbarger, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971); Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir.
1970).
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discrimination if you will, in a sense of religious preference. First there is
Unitarian Church v. McConnell,2 "- which is an interesting case because the
Unitarian Church was using pornography for sex education on a religious
basis. (That is a great church. Want to take that up with the bishops,
Bud?). Anyway, it must have been some juicy pornography because the
district attorney moved in to hold them on an obscenity charge and the
Church went into court and stopped him. And not only did they stop him,
(to declare what he was doing wrong), but they put him under an injunc-
tion, (the Federal Court did), which is pretty good.
Then you have cases like Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics,26 where a
group tried to come in and have the law changed so that they could use
peyote (just like the North American Indian Church) for their religious
ceremonies, and the Bureau refused to let them do it. People v. Crawford,7
is where a fellow was accused of possession of LSD, he says no, its a matter
of religion with me. And they said, oh yea, you're on a trip baby.
Then of course there was the case of the Amish children, which all of
you know about where the Amish wanted to take their children out of
school." Again this is a form of the state stepping in, saying you can't
discriminate that way on a religious basis, and the Supreme Court said
they could. That coincides similarly with Pierce v. Society of Sisters.29
And finally you get down to the question of a private institution acting
against an individual and the individual saying, hey, wait a minute, you
can't do that; or I want something done and the private institution says,
no, you can't do it for religious reasons (where the religious reasons rest
with the institution); and this type of case is reflected by the tubal ligation
cases.
Now what is the answer to all of this? I am not sure I know, if you
start looking into the area of state action, you are going to find the concept
of "state action" severely criticized and probably rightfully So. 30
In the article written by Jerre Williams from Texas University, on The
Twilight of State Action,"1 he suggests that the real way of testing this is
to see how rights compare. How they balance. How they push against each
other. That was the idea of the ball. Which side is which? Is it better to
weigh this side against that side or not? Which rights are going to survive?
Secondly, I think that another way of looking to the solution to this prob-
lem is to draw yourself a scale. Go back to your basic law school philoso-
337 F. Supp. 1252 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
452 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1972).
69 Misc. 2d 500, 328 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1972).
z' Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
See Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEX. L. REV. 347 (1963); Black, Jr.
Foreword: "State Action, " Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 69 (1967); 7 U. RicHMOND L. REV. 343 (1972).
"' See note 30, supra.
19 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1973
phy, and say on the one hand we have "rights", by this I mean a secured
interest with a collateral duty in someone else which you can enforce. And
on ther other hand we have a "liberty", about which the only thing I can
enforce is non-interference by the state. And then ask yourself where does
the action lie, is it closer to the "right" end, you can bet your bottom
dollar, that somebody is going to say, okay, it has got to be enforced. If
it's closer to the "liberty" end, there is a chance that the state might not
do anything about it. I think, for instance, in the abortion cases you have
the Supreme Court finding that these girls have, what I would call a
"liberty". If there is a "liberty," there is no correlative duty which can be
enforced, except non-interference by the State. That is just one way of
looking at it.
(If you want the better verbiage; don't call it a right to discriminate, call it
a right of preference. That is a much better sounding way, you know. It is
like when you are talking about tubal ligations. If you are for them, you call
it "sterilization surgery"; if you are against them, you call it "contraceptive
surgery").
Are you over on the "right" side; or are you over here on the "liberty" side?
Let me give you one case to illustrate the point, and that is Palmer v.
Thompson." Palmer was a case about swimming pools, because five of
them were white and one was black, and these people sued to have them
opened up again. The Supreme Court refused to require Jackson, Missis-
sippi to open them up. Now of course I know what the Court said; they
said that we find that Jackson did it only for economic reasons. This is
what we find, that is what we are saying. But, suppose it had been a school.
Suppose there were five white schools and one black school, and Jackson
had shut them all down because "we can't run them for economic reasons."
What do you think the Court would have said? It would have said, you
open them up on an integrated basis; that is most probably what the
Supreme Court would have said. Well, now that is an illustration of what
I have referred to as the difference between a "right" and a "liberty". In
the education field, discrimination on race basis, rights. In the field of
recreation by swimming, that is a "liberty".
Another case illustrative of the same scale, is Mulvehill v. Julia But-
terfield Memorial Hospital,n which was a case incidentally similar to the
Simkins case 3 that Vince was talking about. Simkins found state action
(via Hill-Burton) in a specified act of discrimination on the basis of race;
whereas, in Mulvehill the Court refused to find state action (via Hill-
32 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
329 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
"' Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 938 (1964); see Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969) (state
action via Hill-Burton for a specified act of discrimination of a geographical basis).
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Burton) for an unspecified (and done without hearing) act of not rehiring
doctors (no reasons being given), rather the Court found that it was a
challenge to due process and that you did not have state action for the
purpose of due process. It's a good case to read.
Finally, in the last case I wanted to mention (and I want to bring this
up, because I think this case is, in a way quite serious) is Holms v. Silver
Cross Hospital of Joliet.15 This was a case in which a woman and her
husband got into an automobile wreck and he was seriously hurt. They
went to a private hospital (Methodist or Baptist, I forget which), and she
said don't give him a blood transfusion because we don't believe in it; and
the hospital went into court and they got a conservator appointed, whose
only function was to say yea or nay to a hospital blood transfusion. He said,
yea. They gave the blood transfusion, the fellow died, and they brought a
cause of action in the federal court. The hospital and everybody connected
on the defendant's side, came in and moved to dismiss. The court in
writing about it, said no, they are not going to permit them to dismiss,
because a cause of action was stated. The court said the conservator was
out, because he had judicial immunity, but that the hospital was in. There
was no statement showing that it had or had not received Hill-Burton. Now
that is important to remember. There was no statement to the effect that
they had or had not received Hill-Burton; so the court could not take it as
shown that they had received Hill-Burton. But without this, the court
looked to the state law showing the governance of hospitals, and they found
state action and because it was alleged that the doctor was acting under
the guidance of the hospital, they found state action in the doctor. And
they said we are going to permit this to be filed. It is a very interesting case,
and you might want to read it.
I think, finally, that the last thing is this. When that young lady comes
into your hospital, and when you are faced with this court thing, I think
you are going to have to go to the court with some kind of argument on
this basis. Any hospital has a right to prefer (or a right to discriminate, if
you want to call it that). It is a greater right; it is better for society to let
this "right" stand against her "liberty" to have a tubal ligation (or abor-
tion). That is the real question. Frankly, I think a good case can be made
for the situation that under the law, private institutions have a right to
discriminate.36 Thank you.
340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. I1. 1972).
See Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973) which suggests indirectly,
that the hospital has a constitutional right to discriminate against Jane Doe who wanted an
abortion. It even goes so far as to suggest that the Doe and Roe cases held that a personal
right to refuse to participate in an abortion was constitutionally protected. See also, Allen v.
Sisters of Saint Joseph, 361 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
